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TIME FOR REFORM? REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, AND 
PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
Colin Harvey∗ 
 
Abstract   
The aim is to explore the protection that international human rights law offers to refugees, 
asylum-seekers, and the forcibly displaced. The ambition of the global rights framework is to 
guarantee a defined range of rights to all human beings, and thus move the basis for normative 
entitlement from exclusive reliance on national membership to a common humanity. This 
comprehensive and international perspective remains formally tied to states - acting 
individually or collectively - in terms of creation and implementation. The norms must find an 
entry point into the empirical world, and there must be clarity on responsibilities for practical 
delivery. It should remain unsurprising that the expectations raised by the normative reach of 
the law are frequently dashed in the complex and difficult human world of instrumental politics, 
power, and conflict. The intention here is to outline the international human rights law context, 
and indicate the value and limitations for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. A 
question is then raised about possible reform.  
 
1. Introduction 
International refugee law is a regime of protection connected to a legally constructed status 
with specified guarantees.1 There is a dedicated supervisory mechanism in place, in the form 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).2 Refugees do 
not only benefit from the rights contained in the 1951 Convention,3 and like all those forcibly 
displaced, exist within a global framework of human rights standards and institutions. Refugee 
law’s anchorage in a particular (and evolving) understanding of a created category co-exists 
with an international legal order that tends to emphasise “all human beings”, “every human 
                                                          
∗ Professor of Human Rights Law, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast.  
1 “International refugee law” as used here refers to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 
UNTS 137, and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267. There are currently 145 
States parties to the 1951 Convention and 146 States parties to the 1967 Protocol.  
2 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGA Resolution 428(V), 14 
December 1950. For an assessment see Katie O’Byrne, “Is there a Need for Better Supervision of the Refugee 
Convention?” (2013) 26 Journal of Refugee Studies 330-359. 
3 Art. 5 of the 1951 Convention provides: “Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and 
benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.” 
being”, “everyone”, “anyone”, “all persons” or “no one”.4 The “everyone” of international 
human rights law (underpinned by the principles of equality and non-discrimination5) suggests 
that what matters, as a starting point, is the fact of being “human”. This does not mean that 
international law neglects the plight of particular individuals or does not recognize multiple 
identities6 or even that there is no acceptance of the place of citizenship and nationality.7 What 
it does promote is scepticism about the many and various ways that human beings can be 
rendered invisible by divisive forms of categorisation and the emergence through time of (ever 
more creative) humanly constructed boundaries. The problem may not necessarily arise so 
sharply for those who benefit already from defined guarantees but it does for those who find 
that the categories equate to ill-treatment. Within the human rights paradigm, the coded world 
of the international regulation of migration, with its terminology of “illegal persons”, “irregular 
movement” and “failed asylum-seekers”, will invite ongoing critique and concern.   
 
 
2. The International Human Rights Context 
2.1. International human rights and refugee law 
The debates that surround the contested interaction between human rights law and refugee law 
can seem legalistic and odd to anyone who views these legal regimes as rooted in similar 
humanitarian imperatives.8 Yet the discussions are of profound significance precisely because 
                                                          
4 See, for example, from the “International Bill of Rights”: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Arts. 1-
6, 8-15, 17-29; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Arts. 6-19, 22, and 26, 999 UNTS 171, 
168 States parties; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Arts. 6-9, 11-13, 15, 
993 UNTS 3, 162 States parties.   
5 See Jason Pobjoy, “Treating Like Alike: The Principle of Non-Discrimination as a Tool to Mandate Equal 
Treatment of Refugees and Beneficiaries of Complementary Protection” (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law 
Review 181-228.  
6 Of the many examples see: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, 
1249 UNTS 13, 188 States parties;  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965 (note the limitation in Art. 1(2) and (3)), 660 UNTS 195, 177 States parties; Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, 194 States parties; International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990 (note the limitation in Art. 3(d)) 2220 UNTS 
3, 47 States parties; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, 2515 UNTS3, 151 States 
parties.  
7 The plight of stateless persons is an ongoing human rights concern, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948, Art. 15; Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, 360 UNTS 117, 82 States parties, and 
Convention on the Reduction on Statelessness 1961, 989 UNTS 175, 60 States parties. There is evidence in the 
“International Bill of Rights” of recognition of self-determination (ICCPR 1966, Art. 1 and ICESCR 1966 Art. 1 
“All peoples”), citizenship (ICCPR 1966, Art. 25) and note the reference to “non-nationals” (ICESCR 1966, Art. 
2(3)).  
8 The relationship between international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law is also the source 
of discussion, particularly given the role of armed conflict in forced displacement, see Vincent Chetail, “Armed 
Conflict and Forced Migration: A Systematic Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Refugee law and 
Human Rights Law” in Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Law in 
Armed Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 700-734.  
they impact on the approach to be taken to current arrangements and future reform. If refugee 
law is tired, anachronistic and a distraction then it may mean that strategic energy is directed 
elsewhere (the further development of international human rights law to protect all those 
forcibly displaced and address root casuses). However, if it regarded as of fundamental and 
ongoing relevance then tactical thought might be invested in its reconstruction and promotion 
(reform that integrates human rights advances more fully into existing international refugee 
law).   
However it may be classified in international law, for those who seek to defend the 
continuing integrity and primacy of refugee law there remains a worry that the potential 
strength and specificity of refugee protection might be undermined in well-intentioned efforts 
to promote human rights.9 In this understanding, human rights law is vital but has instrumental 
value in keeping the refugee definition relevant and objectively delimited,10 developing the 
interpretation of specific guarantees of refugee law, and securing additional protections to 
refugees in general, and to specific groups of refugees.11  
As Vincent Chetail notes, if the starting point is the primacy of refugee law then human 
rights law will be essentially supplementary, with the temptation among refugee lawyers to 
stress its limitations and supporting role.12 Chetail challenges this thinking, and argues that the 
“fetishism of the Geneva Convention is no longer tenable”.13 He reverses the normative order 
by stressing that refugee law14  is a limited legal regime15 and supports international human 
rights law as the main basis now for refugee protection. He suggests that:  
 
                                                          
9 See James C. Hathaway, “Leveraging Asylum” (2010) 45 Texas International Law Journal 503-536, at 504: 
“The problem is that none of these new sources of international protection expressly defines how members of the 
broader class of non-returnable persons are to be treated. In contrast to the Refugee Convention […], the new 
protections against refoulement are bare-bones entitlements (footnotes omitted).” Hathaway is equally concerned 
about “the persistent overstatement of the reach of international refugee law” (535). See also, James C. Hathaway 
and Jason Pobjoy, “Queer Cases Make Bad Law” (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Policy 315-389.  
10 See James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014; Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from 
Deprivation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
11 While acknowledging the significance of the evolution of international human rights law, Hathaway emphasises 
the limitations, and as a consequence views the Refugee Convention as fundamental still, see James C. Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 119-147. 
12 See Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations 
between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law” in Ruth Rubio-Marín (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 19-72.   
13 Ibid. 72. 
14 “[T]he Geneva Convention is not a human rights treaty in the orthodox sense, for both historical and legal 
reasons.” Ibid. 22.  
15 “[C]ompared to human rights law, the Geneva Convention has much more to receive than to give.” Ibid. 70.  
The gravitational force of human rights law has attracted the Geneva Convention into 
its orbit and anchored it as a satellite within the constellation of other applicable human 
rights treaties.16 
 
Chetail also draws out the political and legal implications, for example, the need to face openly 
the human rights violations that give rise to displacement, thus retaining a holistic perspective 
on refugee protection in its human rights context.17 One of the implications is that the general 
guarantees of human rights law may offer more protection than the specialist regime.18  
 Human rights law and refugee law are limited mechanisms for the protection of 
refugees, asylum-seekers and the forcibly displaced. Refugees benefit from both regimes, and 
it is evident that where applicable human rights guarantees go further than refugee law they 
can and should be used. The growth of complementary forms of protection – as a way of 
reflecting international human rights obligations – is notable.19 There is an understandable 
tendency among advocates of refugee law to highlight its strengths, and thus a need to be 
reminded of its limits and how far human rights law has travelled. Refugee law speaks to a 
world where international norms are realised through a carefully constructed status that many 
states are content to endorse and use. Human rights law is working towards a paradigm where 
guarantees apply to everyone, and people are then shielded from violations of accepted 
international norms. Whatever view is taken, it is now well-established that international 
human rights law is key; in the encouragement of complementary forms of protection,20 and in 
recognising a more expansive range of reasons for flight.21 The longer term question for 
advocates of refugee law is whether interpretative internal renewal is sufficient or defensible. 
If not, then it is time for a determined reform project that would seek over time to achieve 
international legal change (through a new protocol to the Refugee Convention or in other 
ways). 
 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 70.  
17 Ibid. 72. Cf. Matthew E. Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limit, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, who builds a case for an expressly political understanding of asylum as against palliative 
or humanitarian conceptions.   
18 See Chetail above footnote 8, at 703: “Contrary to the common belief of many humanitarian and refugee law 
specialists, the most specific norm is not always the most protective one. In fact, rather the contrary is true.” 
19 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012, at 53. 
20 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2007.  
21 See McAdam above footnote 19, ch 3.  
2.2. International human rights law: relevant standards 
International human rights law provides a wide-ranging source of norms, and is underpinned 
by an institutional architecture. As Sarah Joseph and Joanna Kyriakakis argue: 
 
While international human rights law has developed to the point where States can no 
longer legitimately claim that human rights are a domestic matter, there are significant 
limits to the international community’s ability to respond to recalcitrant States that 
persist in human rights abuses. Enforcement machinery has not kept pace with standard-
setting.22 
 
There are evident gaps, weaknesses and limits but it retains normative value. Given the reach 
of international human rights law, and its relevance for all those displaced and in need of 
protection, it could be said that the whole body of law is potentially applicable and relevant.23 
The effective implementation and enforcement of international standards is also a core element 
of prevention, and ultimately in tackling the root causes of refugee movements. Would 
displacement be the global concern it is if human rights standards were adequately reflected in 
lived experience? The legal and political rationale of the entire system is precisely to eliminate 
the causes of forced displacement, as well as ensuring all persons (wherever located) are treated 
with dignity and respect.  
The application of international human rights law may involve formal constraints, for 
example, the state may not be a party (this may be true also for the Refugee Convention) or 
reservations may be in place.  The individual may not be accorded a right to petition the treaty-
monitoring body, and international norms may have little or no direct applicability at the 
national level.24 A State party that may be bound by relevant international standards may 
demonstrate scant practical respect and adopt a relaxed attitude towards the relevant monitoring 
                                                          
22 Sarah Joseph and Joanna Kyriakakis, “The United Nations and Human Rights” in Sarah Joseph and Adam 
McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, 
USA, Edward Elgar, 2010, ch 1, at 2, and as they also note, at 26, the decisions made by the UN human rights 
institutions examined are not legally binding, thus enforcement is through “naming and shaming”. 
23 Refugees are specifically mentioned in other instruments, for example, Art. 22, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 (see above footnote 6) which deals with “a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a 
refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures”, Art. 22(1). See above 
footnote 6 for reference to some express limitations.  
24 For an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of international and regional human rights supervisory 
mechanisms (in the context of a wider discussion on refugee protection) see, Joanna Whiteman and Claire Nielsen, 
“Lessons from Supervisory Mechanisms in International and Regional Law” (2013) 26 Journal of Refugee Studies 
360-392.  
mechanisms. In addition, although the relevance of customary international norms should not 
be neglected, it is not also easy to achieve agreement on their scope (or existence) in this area.25  
The formal picture will not capture everything, as practical deployment of human rights 
can lead to levels of relevance and impact that are not explicable by the “pedigree” of the norm. 
At national level, it is sometimes possible to use international standards and guidance in useful 
ways that transcend reliance on notions of monism/dualism or obligations under international 
treaties. This is not to undermine the ultimate utility of being able to speak of binding and 
authoritative obligations, and legal responsibility. It is to make the simple point that in this 
interconnected age individuals and communities will use all the available tools to advance their 
arguments. On occasions this approach works.  
 As noted, the “International Bill of Rights” is generally insistent on inclusive 
applicability and the erosion of distinctions based on citizenship (for the purpose of rights 
protection). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 notes in its preamble that the 
membership that matters is of the “human family” and that “recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members … is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world”. The inclusion of “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution”26 is much commented on, as is the limitation “in the case of 
prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations”.27  Article 14 thus envisages a right that should be 
enjoyed by everyone based on the protection of all persons from persecution. In order to seek 
asylum in other countries a person must have freedom to move or leave. The free movement 
rights in Article 13 include the right of everyone to “leave any country, including his [her] own, 
and to return to his [her] country”.28 The remaining rights in the UDHR 1948 speak to the 
plight of refugees and asylum-seekers on matters such as non-discrimination (Articles 2 and 
7), detention (Articles 3 and 9), torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 
5), recognition as a person before the law (Article 6), the protection of privacy and family life 
(Articles 12 and 16), the right to a nationality (Article 15), freedom of thought, conscience, 
                                                          
25 See Hathaway (2010) above footnote 9. 
26 Art. 14(1). See also, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993 para 23: “The World Conference on Human Rights 
reaffirms that everyone, without distinction of any kind, is entitled to the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution, as well as the right to return to one’s own country.” 
27 Art. 14(2).  
28 Art. 13(2). For the development of this right see Vincent Chetail, “The transnational movement of persons under 
general international law – Mapping the customary law foundations of international migration law” in Vincent 
Chetail and Céline Bauloz (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham, 
UK/Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2014, 1-72, 9-27. 
religion, opinion and expression (Article 18 and 19), as well to a range of social and economic 
rights, such as to social security (Article 22), to work (Article 23), an adequate standard of 
living (Article 25), and a right to education (Article 26). The rights are intended to be enjoyed 
by everyone, and include all those seeking protection whatever their formal designation or 
status. While most of the rights contained in the UDHR 1948 now have a more specific 
normative home beyond the Declaration, the attempt to craft an international treaty on a right 
to asylum failed. 
 
The refusal of States to accept an obligation to grant asylum, in the sense of admission 
to residence and lasting protection against the jurisdiction of another State, is amply 
evidenced by the history of international conventions and other instruments.29 
 
Despite trends evident at the regional level,30 subsequent events repeatedly demonstrated the 
unwillingness of states to accept asylum as a right possessed by the individual and their 
insistence that this “right” was an intrinsic aspect of state sovereignty. As Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill and Jane McAdam note “State practice is replete with examples of asylum given; the 
humanitarian practice exists, but the sense of obligation is missing”.31  
 The human rights advances that continue to be made are in the development of the 
prohibition on return, and as a result, the emergence of complementary forms of protection.32 
The non-refoulement obligation is not confined to the provisions of the Refugee Convention or 
to refugee law and practice.33 Human rights law increasingly drives the evolution of the norm.34 
                                                          
29 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
3rd ed. 2007, 358, and see 361-364 for the path to the 1977 Conference on Territorial Asylum, including the 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum 1967 (592-593). 
30 Such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 Art. 12(3): “Every individual shall have the 
right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the law of those countries 
and international conventions.” See also: Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, Art. 28; American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969, Art. 22(7); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 Art. 12(3); Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 18.  
31 See above footnote 29, at 369.  
32 See McAdam above footnote 20.  
33 Art. 33(1) of the Refugee Convention is also followed by Art. 33(2). At the regional level see: OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969, Art. II; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
1984, Section III; Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees 1966. See also: UN Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum 1967, Art. 3. Rebecca M.M. Wallace, ‘The principle of non-refoulement in international 
refugee law’ Vincent Chetail and Céline Bauloz (eds.) Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, 417-438; E. Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, “The Scope and 
Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement” in Erica Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds.), Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, 87-163. 
34 As Goodwin-Gill notes: “The principle of non-refoulement … has slipped the bounds of the 1951 Convention, 
requiring states at large not to return people to face the risk of persecution, torture, or other serious violations of 
The UN Human Rights Committee (like other treaty-monitoring bodies) embraces the 
protection35 (principally on return to Article 6 and Article 7 ill-treatment), and regional courts 
have also willingly adopted the approach.36 The prohibition on return gained express 
recognition in the Convention against Torture 1984: 
 
1. No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights. 
 
The UN Committee against Torture continues to develop its jurisprudence on the precise 
meaning of this obligation.37 The principle is also included in the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006: 
 
1. No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”), surrender or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be 
in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
                                                          
fundamental rights.” Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “Editorial: The Dynamic of International Refugee Law” (2013) 25 
International Journal of Refugee Law 651-666, 654. See also, Chetail above footnote 12. There is ongoing debate 
on the impact and implications: See Hathaway above footnote 9, and McAdam above footnote 20.  
35 This does not mean that the non-refoulement obligation is the only principle of relevance to refugees.  
36 Notably the European Court of Human Rights, see D.J. Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2014, 244-256. In so doing, the Court has clarified the application 
of Art. 3 in a range of contexts, including push-back policies (Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09 
(23 February 2012) GC) which has then informed the work of UNHCR, among others, see UNHCR, Global 
Initiative on Protection at Sea, Geneva, UNHCR, 2014. See further Anja Klug, “Strengthening the Protection of 
Migrants and Refugees in Distress at Sea through International Cooperation and Burden-Sharing” (2014) 26 
International Journal of Refugee Law 48-64. 
37 UN Committee against Torture, General Comment 1: Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the 
Context of Article 22, A/53/44, annex IX; N.T.W v Switzerland Comm. No. 414/2007 (2012) 
CAT/C/48/D/414/2010; Jahani v Switzerland Comm. No. 357/08 (2011), CAT/C/46/D/357/2008. 
or mass violations of human rights or of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.38 
 
As noted, other elements of the international human rights system recognize the prohibition,39 
and it is also adopted at the regional level.40 Other rights protected in international law will 
apply to refugees, for example, the use of detention around the world has attracted concern. 
One the of limitations remains, however, that the international mechanisms are not always clear 
about what then positively happens to those who cannot be returned for human rights reasons.41  
This is addressed to some extent by the creation of complementary protection systems, and it 
is possible to draw together (from the body of existing international human rights law) the basic 
obligations that should apply. Nevertheless, despite its flaws it is refugee law’s ability to 
address this question with more precision that remains its most valuable characteristic. It is 
equally the case that international human rights law is not silent on this matter. 
 
3. Using International Human Rights Protection 
The aim now is to consider contexts where the normative framework is used. One way of doing 
this is to reflect on the work of the UN Human Rights Committee in relevant individual 
communications.42 As indicated, the ICCPR 1966 reflects the language of “humanity” with its 
references to “all individuals”, “every human being”, “everyone” and “all persons”, and the 
Human Rights Committee has confirmed this inclusive approach.43  How has the Committee 
dealt with communications in this area? 
 
3.1. UN Human Rights Committee 
                                                          
38 Art. 16. 
39 See, for example, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied 
and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6; UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 22: Article 5 and Refugees and Displaced 
Persons (1996), A/51/18. 
40 See above footnote 36, and American Convention on Human Rights 1969, Art. 22(8); Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1985, Art. 13(4); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Art. 19(2). 
41 On this point, with reference to the European Court of Human Rights, see Hélène Lambert, “Introduction: 
European refugee law and transnational emulation” in Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam, and Maryellen Fullerton 
(eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, ch 1, at 23.  
42 The work of the UN Committee against Torture is addressed elsewhere in this collection.  
43 See, UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004). For analysis see Aoife Duffy, “Expulsion 
to Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law” (2008) International Journal of Refugee Law 373-390, at 384-
385; Santhosh Persaud, Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 132, 2006, UNHCR/Geneva. 
Arguably, it is the work on non-refoulement that has thus far proved the most instructive. The 
Committee contributes to the evolution of the principle through its interpretation of relevant 
provisions of the ICCPR: 
 
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control 
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from 
their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk 
of irreparable harm such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 either in the country 
to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may 
subsequently be removed.44 
 
In applying Articles 6 and 7 the Committee stresses the personal nature of the risk, and that 
there is a “high threshold” to be attained before substantial grounds will be established of a real 
risk of irreparable harm.45  
The ICCPR 1966 is not only relevant to return but also applies to, for example, 
detention.46 Where there is a finding of a violation, the Committee notes that the individual has 
a right to “an effective and enforceable remedy”.47 The Committee is also, through its 
Concluding Observations, able to offer specific recommendations on how refugee and asylum 
processes might be improved.48  
Given the use of the ICCPR in extradition, deportation or expulsion it is worth exploring 
how the Committee has approached this task in selected communications. X v Denmark 
involved an Eritrean national ordered to leave Denmark following an unsuccessful asylum 
application.49 He argued that his removal to Eritrea would violate Articles 7 and 18 (the 
author’s Article 14 claim - relating to the Refugee Appeals Board -  was held to be 
                                                          
44 UN Human Rights Committee above footnote 43 para. 12. See also: General Comment 20: Article 7 (Prohibition 
of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1992).  
45 X v Denmark, Communication No. 2007/2010 (2014), UN Doc. CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2012 (2014), para. 9.2. 
46 F.K.A.G. v Australia, UNHRC, Communication No. 2094/2011 (2013), CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011. 
47 X v Denmark, above footnote 45, para. 9.7. See M.I. v Sweden, UNHRC, Communication No. 2149/2012 (2013), 
CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012, para. 9, in deportation cases an effective remedy includes: “full reconsideration of her 
claim regarding the risk of treatment contrary to article 7 … taking into account the State party’s obligations under 
the Covenant and the Committee’s present Views. In the meantime, the State party is requested to refrain from 
expelling the author to Bangladesh while her request for asylum is under reconsideration. The State party is also 
under the obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.”   
48 See, for example, UNHRC, Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland (2014) para. 19.  
49 X v Denmark, above footnote 45.  
inadmissible50) as he would refuse to perform military service due to his religious beliefs, and 
thus face ill-treatment. The author also indicated his inability to demonstrate he had left Eritrea 
lawfully and the fact of his asylum application, would further contribute to his treatment on 
return. In concluding that there would be a violation of Article 7 if the author was removed, 
the Committee was influenced by the “credible sources [that] indicate that illegal entrants, 
failed asylum seekers and draft evaders risk serious ill-treatment upon repatriation to Eritrea”.51 
The Committee concluded:  
 
[T]hat the State party did not adequately address the concern that the author’s personal 
circumstances … might lead to him being designated as a failed asylum seeker and as 
an individual who has not completed the compulsory military service requirement in 
Eritrea or as a conscientious objector.52 
 
M.I. v Sweden involved the question of sexual orientation, forced marriage, and 
deportation to Bangladesh.53 The author was living in Sweden, and was forced to return to 
Bangladesh (when her husband learned of her sexual orientation), where she alleged she was 
detained, beaten and raped (and that her partner was kidnapped). She subsequently returned to 
Sweden where she claimed asylum (on the basis of the treatment of lesbians in Bangladesh by 
state and non-state actors). Her asylum claim in Sweden was rejected, and the issue for the 
Committee was whether there would be a violation of Article 7 if she was deported. The 
Committee noted that the author’s allegation that she was raped by the Bangladeshi police 
while in detention was not challenged, her sexual orientation was not contested (and it was in 
the public domain), her mental health was affected,54 and stressed that the inconsistencies and 
any ambiguity in her evidence did not undermine the reality of the risk.55 The Committee also 
observed that the existence of a law criminalising homosexual acts in Bangladesh stigmatised 
the LGBT community and “constitutes an obstacle to the investigation and sanction of 
persecution against these persons”.56 The Committee indicated: 
 
                                                          
50  Ibid. para. 8.5.  
51  Ibid. para. 9.3. The source cited by the Committee is the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the 
International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Eritrea (April 2009). 
52 See above footnote 45, para. 9.3. 
53 M.I. v Sweden, UNHRC, Communication No. 2149/2012 (2013), CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012. 
54 Ibid. para. 7.2. 
55 Ibid. para. 7.5. 
56 Ibid. para. 7.5. 
Against the background of the situation faced by persons belonging to sexual 
minorities, as reflected in reports provided by the parties, the Committee is of the view 
that, in the particular case of the author, the State party failed to take into due 
consideration the author’s allegations regarding the events she experienced in 
Bangladesh because of her sexual orientation – in particular her mistreatment by the 
police – in assessing the alleged risk she would face if returned to her country of 
origin.57 
 
 
In S.Y.L. v Australia the questions included return where it was claimed there would be 
no access to appropriate medical care.58 The author and his family faced deportation to Timor-
Leste (following unsuccessful claims for refugee and humanitarian protection in Australia) and 
argued that this would “deny them their right to health, which they could not receive anywhere 
else”.59 While there was acknowledgement that the author and his wife did “suffer from several 
chronic illnesses”,60 the Committee raised concerns about the level of detail in the medical 
reports provided by the author, noted that reasons had not been provided why he could not live 
elsewhere in the country (where medical treatment was available), and there was no 
“information indicating an acute condition that would make the author’s return to Timor Leste 
an immediate threat to his health”.61 The Committee concluded that the claim was inadmissible. 
The questions raised by the Australian approach to detention were addressed in 
F.K.A.G. et al. v Australia.62 The 37 authors63 of this communication were held in Australian 
immigration facilities, and alleged violations of a range of provisions of the ICCPR 1966.64 
While there was acceptance of their protection needs (the authors were recognized as refugees 
either by the Australian authorities or UNHCR65) the adults were refused visas due to adverse 
security assessments and thus detained pending removal.66 The authors challenged their 
treatment, and alleged breaches of Articles 9(1), (2), (4); 7; 10(1); 17(1); 23(1); 24(1), raising 
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60 Ibid. para 8.4. 
61 Ibid. para 8.4. 
62 Communication No. 2094/2011 (2013), CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011. 
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65 See above footnote 62 para. 2.3. 
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questions concerning the automatic nature of detention, the security assessments, the remedies 
available, the personal impact of detention, and the implications for family life.   The State 
party contested these allegations, and highlighted, for example, the availability of judicial 
review, and acknowledged that they were refugees and that the non-refoulement obligation 
applied to any removal.67 The Committee concluded that Australia had violated Article 9(1), 
as there was no individual basis for the detention, no consideration of other less invasive 
measures and the authors were deprived of legal safeguards (there was also a separate violation 
of Article 9(4)).68 The Committee accepted that asylum-seekers who enter unlawfully may be 
detained “for a brief initial period” but that any additional detention is arbitrary “absent 
particular reasons specific to the individual”.69 There should be a case-by-case assessment and 
“less invasive measures” must be taken into account.70 The decision must “take into account 
the needs of children and the mental health conditions of those detained”.71  
 
Individuals must not be detained indefinitely on immigration control grounds if the 
State party is unable to carry out their expulsion.72 
 
For most of the authors the Committee held that there was no breach of Article 9(2) but for the 
“Oceanic Viking Group”73 a prior security assessment provided the basis for the initial 
detention (with no specific reasons or information) and as a result there was a violation. The 
conditions of detention, and their protracted and indefinite duration, contributed to a breach of 
Article 7 as this was “cumulatively inflicting serious psychological harm upon them”.74 The 
Human Rights Committee addressed similar issues in M.M.M. et al v Australia and with largely 
the same substantive outcome.75 
Choudhary v Canada involved the deportation of a Pakistani national who feared ill-
treatment (including from a Sunni extremist group) as a result of a fatwa, and a criminal charge 
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71 See above footnote 62 para. 9.3. 
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75 M.M.M. et al v Australia, UNHRC Communication No. 2136/2012, (2013), CCPR/C/108/D/2136/2012 
of blasphemy.76 He claimed that his rights - and the rights of his wife and 3 of his children - 
would be violated. His refugee application in Canada was rejected on credibility grounds. In 
finding a violation of Articles 6(1) and 7 (in the event of the deportation being carried out) the 
Committee indicated that religious minorities faced “fierce persecution and insecurity” and 
lacked effective state protection,77 the government had dropped a proposed amendment to the 
blasphemy code, and there was an “upsurge in blasphemy cases in 2012”.78 Although there 
was evidence that death sentences were not carried out, “several instances of extra-judicial 
assassination, by private actors, of members of religious minorities accused under the 
blasphemy law have been reported, without the Pakistani authorities being willing or able, to 
protect them”.79  
In Al-Gertani v Bosnia and Herzegovina an Iraqi national in an immigration detention 
centre, who had deserted from the army (with consequences in particular for his brother), and 
whose asylum claim was dismissed based on security concerns and credibility (he had gained 
citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 under a false name), argued that his return to 
Iraq would breach several ICCPR rights.80 His complaints in relation to Articles 9(1), (2), (4); 
17; 23 and 24 were held to be admissible, the rest were not.   The Committee concluded that 
the State party had breached Article 9(1) as it had “failed to justify the necessity of continued 
and prolonged detention … and to demonstrate that other, less intrusive measures could not 
have achieved the same end”.81 There were also violations of Articles 9(2) and (4), due to the 
lack of information provided to the author, and the nature and conduct of the review by the 
courts in the State party.82  In finding that there would be a breach of Articles 17 and 24 (impact 
on family life) the Committee underlined the impact that the national security rationale had on 
the treatment of the author; he was not in a position to deal with the allegations that he posed 
a security threat.  
In Hamida v Canada the author (a Tunisian national living in Canada) faced expulsion 
to Tunisia.83 His refugee claim in Canada was rejected, one of the reasons being (credibility 
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79 Ibid para. 9.8 
80 Al-Gertani v Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNHRC Communication No. 1955/2010 (2013), 
CCPR/C/109/D/1955/2010.  
81 Ibid. para. 10.4. 
82 Ibid paras. 10.5 and 10.6. 
83 Hamida v Canada, UNHRC Communication No. 1544/2007 (2010), CCPR/C/98/D/1544/2007. See also 
Warsame v Canada UNHRC Communication No. 1959/2010, on the question of proposed deportation as a result 
of the author’s criminal activity in Canada, the significance of retaining a focus on the reality of the risk of 
and alleged lack of evidence were among the other factors84) that the Refugee Convention did 
not apply by virtue of Article 1(F) (a) and (c).85 The author was a former member of the 
“Political Security Section” of the Ministry of Interior, and given that torture was practised by 
the Section on a routine basis, the authorities had concluded that he should be excluded.86 The 
complaint included the argument that he would face detention, and a risk of torture or 
disappearance on return.87 The Committee highlighted that: 
 
[W]hen the author’s claims were considered by the State party’s authorities, much 
weight was given to the fact that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees did 
not apply to him and it appears that inadequate consideration was given to the specific 
rights of the author under the Covenant and such other instruments as the Convention 
Against Torture.88  
 
The author’s Article 6 complaint did not convince the Committee, and was found to involve 
“no more than general allegations mentioning the risk of detention inhuman conditions and the 
fact that he would be deprived of access to justice and might disappear”.89 The Committee was 
persuaded by the Article 7 complaint, and concluded that substantial evidence was provided 
that the author did have a real and personal risk.90 As a consequence of his dissent he had been 
disciplined and detained (with pressure exerted on his family), his asylum application in 
Canada would, the Committee noted, also mark him out as an opponent of the regime.91   
The matter of diplomatic assurances in a security context was addressed in Alzery v 
Sweden.92 In this case the author was returned to Egypt following assurances (and subjected to 
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90 Hamida ibid. para. 8.7. The Committee underlined, “his dissent in the Tunisian police, his six-month police 
detention, the strict administrative surveillance to which he was subjected and the wanted notice issued against 
him by the Ministry of the Interior”.  
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92 Alzery v Sweden, UNHRC Communication No. 1416/2005 (2006), CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005. For comment 
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ill-treatment), and argued that in so doing Sweden violated several provisions of the ICCPR. 
On the question of assurances the Committee stated: 
 
In determining the risk of such treatment in the present case, the Committee must 
consider all relevant elements, including the general situation of human rights in the 
State. The existence of diplomatic assurances, their content and the existence and 
implementation of enforcement mechanisms are all factual elements relevant to the 
overall determination of whether, in fact, a real risk of proscribed ill-treatment exists.93 
 
As a result of findings by the Committee against Torture in Agiza v Sweden,94 the State party 
“conceded that there was a risk of ill-treatment” and that it “relied on the diplomatic assurances 
alone for its belief”.95 In finding that the expulsion did amount to a violation of Article 7, the 
Committee noted the factors that would determine whether any assurances would be 
sufficiently robust.96 There was “no mechanism for monitoring their enforcement” and no 
arrangements for “effective implementation”, the visits that did take place only started after 
five weeks, and did not “conform to key aspects of international good practice”.97  The 
Committee also upheld the Article 7 claims in relation to the ill-treatment by “foreign agents” 
at the airport, and the associated complaints around the inadequacies of the subsequent 
investigation,98 as well as the allegations on the lack of an “independent review of the Cabinet’s 
decision to expel”.99 
 
By the nature of refoulement, effective review of a decision to expel to an arguable risk 
of torture must have an opportunity to take place prior to expulsion, in order to avoid 
irreparable harm to the individual and rendering the review otiose and devoid of 
meaning. The absence of any opportunity for effective, independent review of the 
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decision to expel in the author’s case accordingly amounted to a breach of article 7, 
read in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant.100 
 
 
The case of Ahani v Canada again raised the interaction between national security and refugee 
protection.101 In this instance, an Iranian citizen was initially granted refugee status in Canada 
but then (following intelligence reports indicating he was working for the Iranian Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security) held to be inadmissible, and he was detained until his eventual 
deportation (before the Committee’s determination). In finding violations of Articles 9(4), 13 
(read with Article 7), and concluding that the State party had breach its obligations under the 
Optional Protocol, the Committee highlighted several procedural problems with challenges 
available against the security certification system in Canada.102 Although the Committee did 
not need to decide on the question of the risk of torture or ill-treatment and whether it had in 
fact taken place on return, it did note that “the prohibition on torture, including as expressed in 
article 7 of the Covenant, is an absolute one that is not subject to countervailing 
considerations”.103 The appropriate effective remedy outlined by the Committee included “to 
make reparation to the author if it comes to light that torture was in fact suffered subsequent to 
deportation” as well as “to avoid similar violations in the future” and this to include 
“appropriate steps to ensure that the Committee’s requests for interim measures of protection 
will be respected”.104 
 These are only some of the communications received by the Committee. Although the 
work of the UN Committee against Torture tends to attract the most attention (on non-
refoulement) the Human Rights Committee does have a wider role in the refugee and asylum 
context. These examples illustrate the relevance of the international human rights machinery 
in cases where refugee status is refused domestically and return proposed, in contexts where 
national security and deportation interact, in setting out the rights that should apply when 
detention is contemplated, and in placing rights-based boundaries on the inter-state use of 
assurances. The limitations are well-known and often emphasised, but the role of the 
Committee in these individual communications, and in the process of standard-setting through 
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interpretative guidance, is significant. The international treaty-monitoring mechanisms can 
help to remind states that negative credibility assessments, a sharpened focus on 
inconsistencies, the anxieties raised by legitimate security concerns, and the domestic public 
policy concerns on migration, should not override the centrality of a rigorous assessment of the 
reality of the risk on return. The work can also give meaning to what a rights-based approach 
should be not simply on non-refoulement but on aspects of the life experience of the forcibly 
displaced.  
 
3.2. Other International Human Rights Mechanisms 
The UN Human Rights Committee is not the only international mechanism of relevance to the 
protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. Other treaty-monitoring bodies have experience of 
dealing with related human rights concerns.  For example, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women has indicated that: 
 
[A]rticle 2(d) of the Convention encompasses the obligation of States parties to protect 
women from being exposed to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of 
gender-based violence, irrespective of whether such consequences would take place 
outside the territorial boundaries of the sending State party (footnote omitted).105 
 
In Rivera v Canada the question of asylum from domestic violence was raised before the 
Committee.106 The author here argued that her deportation to Mexico (and that of her two 
children) would violate Articles 1, 2(a)-(d), 5(a) and 24 of the Convention. The Canadian 
authorities did note that gender-based persecution claims could be successful, but that in this 
instance the author had not demonstrated the relevant risk.107 Canada argued successfully here 
that the author had failed to exhaust domestic remedies (the author should have made use of 
the available remedy of judicial review).108  
 In its General Recommendation No. 30 “on women in conflict prevention, conflict and 
post-conflict situations” the Committee underlines the complementarity of international 
humanitarian, refugee and criminal law.109  
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 The provisions of the Convention prohibiting discrimination against women reinforce 
and complement the international legal protection regime for refugees and displaced 
and stateless women and girls in many settings, especially because explicit gender 
equality provisions are absent from relevant international agreements, notably the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.110 
 
The Committee highlights why these recommendation can be of some practical value by 
making precise and detailed suggestions that give meaning to the relevant standards.111 
 In Dawas and Shava v Denmark the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination held that Denmark had violated Articles 2(1)(d) and 6 of the Convention as a 
result of a failure to protect the petitioners (refugees living in Denmark), and a failure to 
conduct an effective investigation into a racist attack.112 The case is illustrative of the potential 
of the process for challenging racial discrimination and racist violence directed against 
refugees. The problems faced by those who are not recognised as refugees and also not returned 
for humanitarian reasons is illustrated in A.M.M. v Switzerland.113 The petitioner applied for 
asylum in Switzerland (fearing persecution on return to Somalia) and was not granted refugee 
status, but was also not returned for humanitarian reasons due to the country situation in 
Somalia at the time. The plight of the petitioner in Switzerland is illustrative of the problems 
faced by those who are not granted refugee status (he held an “F” permit that signalled his 
temporary admission status). The complaint was that the treatment experienced was a result of 
the petitioner’s ethnic origin or Somali nationality and violated the Convention. The State party 
argued, however, that the issues raised related to his status under the law (on temporary 
admission) that applied in Switzerland to all foreign nationals. The Committee’s view was that 
the petitioner had not “unequivocally established” that the discriminatory treatment was the 
result of his ethnic origin or nationality and therefore there was no violation of Article 1.114 
Nevertheless, the Committee still commented on the position of those with temporary 
admission status in Switzerland, drew the attention of the State party to its General 
Recommendation No. 30 (2004),115 and recommended a review of current law and practice.116   
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Conclusion  
The potential normative reach of international human rights law is impressive, and its growth 
in a relatively short historical period is remarkable. All those displaced are in principle included 
within its embrace; status and location are not primary concerns. This does not mean that states 
are prepared to welcome a new and expanded approach to the international definition of 
“refugee” or are now more open to accepting a guaranteed right to be granted asylum. The 
instrumental imperatives of migration management continue to shape national, regional and 
international responses. It also does not prohibit states from regulating migration or from 
making distinctions in national law and practice that respect the boundaries established by 
international human rights law.  
Human rights law informs refugee law to such an extent (in definitional and substantive 
terms) that the relevance of the latter is questioned.117 It shifts the focus towards human rights 
violations and abuses, including those that cause displacement. The evolution of the principle 
of non-refoulement stands out as a striking contribution. It is able to evolve at such a pace at 
the international and regional levels, precisely because mechanisms of monitoring, supervision 
and enforcement exist and are tied to the relevant rights. Refugee law, with its essentially 
devolved system of implementation, can achieve this too through developments at the national 
level, comparative experience, international interventions and the work of UNHCR. There is a 
tension that will remain. The interpretative gains achieved through adjudicative mechanisms, 
and the interventions of the international human rights regime, can be contested by states. Over 
the longer term the question of explicit reform of international refugee law should not be 
neglected. Rather than invite the emergence of piecemeal and variable forms of status might 
there be scope for international refugee law to draw relevant international human rights trends 
expressly into its domain? Is it time to accept the implications of the advance of human rights 
and open up the concept of refugee once again so that it reflects the reality of displacement 
more fully, with all the associated implications for UNHCR and other institutions? Or is the 
better option to continue to encourage support for the Refugee Convention (properly 
understood), embed the current definitional framework further (informed by human rights 
norms) and seek equal treatment for the other complementary or subsidiary forms of protection 
that emerge? 
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